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World: Tht Dangerous Life and Mysterious Dis-
appearance of Fred Cuny. New York: Doubleday. 
1999. 374pp. $24.95 (clo1h). 
Occasionally a biography is writlen about an individual 
who is "cut" from a different piece of clo1h 1han lhat of the 
rest of us. The Ma11 Who Tried to Save the World: The Dan-
gerous Life (lfld Mysttrious Disappearance of Fnd Cuny is 
such a biography. Scotl Anderson. a war correspondent who 
has covered numerous connicts around the world, tells the 
story of this most extraordinary humanitarian relief expen. 
Fred Cuny considered the interests of sirangers to be more 
imponant than those of his own and eventually gave his life 
in the pursuit of rendering assistance to those who most 
needed it. Some readers may have difficulty calling Cuny a 
hero because he left his son with his parents so that he could 
satisfy his "higher" calling, but Cuny was an extraordinary 
man who faced an extraordinary moral dilemma: "Do I stay 
to watch my son's basketball game, or do I go back out 
there where people arc counting on me. where if I don't go 
another five, six. one thousand-pick a number-people 
are going to dier' Although The Mar1 \Vito Tried 10 Save the 
World is not a case of hero worship nor a treatise on social 
justice, it docs portray a man who felt deeply about the in-
justices perpetrated against the poorer peoples of the world 
and who worked on their behalf. Unlike the writings on jus-
tice by theoreticians like John Rawls and Robert Nozick 
and the conduct by activists like Gandhi and Manin Luther 
King, Jr .. Anderson ·s book ponrays Fred Cuny as a prac1i-
tioner-a man of immense practical ability and drive, who 
possessed a vision of just.ice and how it should work in the 
world. 
In the Preface. Anderson sets the stage for Pans One. 
Three. and Four which deal with the background and cir-
cumstances surrounding Cuny's disappearance in Chechnya 
in April 1995. Some or Anderson ·s nam11ive is extremely 
chilling. The author's description of the shelling of Bamut, 
a small town 11 miles from Grozny and the town in which 
Cuny was last seen alive. captures the sense of hopeless-
ness and terror that is felt by people caught in such predica-
ments. What makes this even more troublesome is 
Anderson's telling pronouncement that the majority of ca-
sualties of wars in the latter decades of this century have 
been civilians (74 percent by the 1980s). Indeed. conflicts 
like those that look place in Bosnia and Rwanda leave little 
doubt to this 1rend. 
Pans One, Three, and Four that deal with Cuny's work 
and disappearance in Chechnya. which constitute the bulk 
of 1he book, give a very interesting ponrayal of Cuny and 
1he problems of working in war-lorn areas such as the 
Caucasus. Cuny's fateful trip into Ingustietia and Chechnya 
began in March I 995. founeen weeks after the conflict be-
tween the Russian army and Chechen separatists began. His 
mission involved a "needs assessment" of the war zone tha1 
was requested by the financier and philanthropist George 
Soros. but expanded 10 include meelings wi1h senior 
Chechen rebel commanders and Russian generals in an al· 
tempt to arrange a cease-fire so that he could evacuate an 
estimated 30,000 civilians from lhe capital cily of Groz.ny. 
Cuny failed to secure a cease-fire, but Anderson makes it 
clear why Cuny's success was to be denied in Chechnya, an 
area that Cuny called "the scariest place l have ever been." 
Anderson observes that the conOicl in Chechnya had a 
tremendous impact on Cuny. As noted by someone who 
worked with Cuny in the field, "he'd [Cuny] always loved 
people, believed in their intrinsic goodness. but ... in 
Chechnya he saw 1he mask of civilizalion slip." Although 
he was usually optimistic in very difficult situations like 
those he faced in the Congo and Bosnia, Cuny lost this sense 
of optimism in the Caucasus. Perhaps Cuny himself lost 
sight of the three mistakes that he thought a person could 
make in Chechnya and which capture the sense of peril that 
was experienced by Cuny. First, "to ever imagine there is a 
pattern. or logic, to any of it. Instead, this is a land and a war 
where any terrible thing can happen at any moment, where 
trying to grasp its full range of lies and treacheries and con-
trndictions st.rains the limits of the human imagination." 
Second, "to ever imagine tha1 one side is better-more com-
passionate, less vicious-than lhe other. In this war. both 
sides have committed a stunning array of crimes." Third, 
"the belief lhat you can change things, bring an end to the 
madness, the awful mistake of imaging you might some-
how save it." These words find their roots in the history of 
Chechnya, a history of a fiercely independent people who 
have since the mid-l 700s seized every opponunity to resist 
any Russian attempt to conquer them. Although the tsarist 
and Stalinist programs to solve the Chechen problem in-
volved lhe use or force to scatter the Chechen people across 
the vast expanses of the Russian empire, lhe Chechens have 
always fought 10 reclaim their homeland. The ou1come of 
the most recent attempt by Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
to subdue lhe self-proclaimed Chechen President Dudayev 
and the Chechen people was a failure, with large numbers 
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of casualties of both combatants and non-combata.nts. 
Anderson's description of the Chechen War and the expla-
nations of its origin make for interesting reading. 
The final ponion of the book deals with Cony's March 
31 trip into Chechnya with four others as well as the man-
hunt by an odd collection of governments and agencies to 
find them after the outside world lost track of them on April 
13. Anderson's explanation of the problems experienced by 
those who seriously scarclu;d for the missin.s group l""d.nge 
from tbe bad timing of trying to focus sufficient attention 
and resources to the search because of the administration's 
preoccupation with the April 21 bombing of the Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City to the U.S. policy to suppon 
Russia and Boris Yeltsin in the face of a crumbling Soviet 
empire and tbe phobia over the Domino Theory being played 
out in Russia. 
Although the bodies of Cuny and the others who disap-
peared have never been recovered, Anderson concludes that 
Cuny and his pany were executed outside the village of Stari-
Atchkoi on April 14. The details of the execution are open 
to debate. The executions may have been carried out to cover 
up a theft of a large amount of money from Cuny or to cover 
up Cuny's knowledge that the abandoned missile base at 
Bamut housed no SS-4 intennediate range nuclear missiles. 
knowledge that some Chechen leaders might not have 
wished to be made public. 
Although much of the book deals with Cuny in 
Chechnya. the more fascinating ponion of the book is found 
in Part 2, which presents not only Cuny's life up to his dis-
appearance, but also a glimpse ofCuny·s vision of humani-
tarian relief. Anderson's presentation provides a fine intro-
duction of this vision for the general reader. though some-
one with more background in this area may find some of his 
presentation of Cuny's ideas overly simplistic. The book 
could have benefitted from greater explanation of thecausal 
relations that Cuny found operating in the world. 
There were a number of pivotal moments in Cuny's 
life that made him fully aware of social injustice in the world 
and that molded his vision of humanitarian relief. Perhaps 
the first was his transfer to Texas College of Ans and Indus-
tries in Kingston. a city that was sharply divided between 
the economic havc's and have-not's, and his earning a de-
gree in international development from the University of 
Houston. This was followed by a short assignment with the 
Federal Model City Program, a program that put him to work 
in developing the infrastructure of the poor. mostly Hispanic. 
town of Eagle Pass. Texas. As Anderson points out, the de-
fining feature of Cuny's vision of development and humani-
tarian aid projects over lhe coming years had its start in this 
small Texas town with the need to take into account the 
wishes of the people the development or humanitarian aid 
project was designed to help. Without their input. Cuny 
thought, the aid project would fail to achieve its potential. 
A third defining moment came during the Biafra-Nige-
ria Civil War (1967-70), Cuny's first encounter with the 
world of disaster relief where he helped coordinate relief 
shipments to thousands of starving Biafrans. It was here 
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that Cuny developed a strong sense of justice and the need 
to actively provide assistance in the face of state sponsored 
genocide. This was followed by a short stint as a refugee 
worker in East Pakistan, which was devastated by a cyclone 
and a civil war. Here Cuny concluded that the disaster relief 
system was outdated and in need of an overhaul. He per· 
ccived too much competition between private groups and 
government agencies, as well as a basic lack of knowledge 
about the region aud culture. which lead tCK> often to inap-
propriate aid and the needless death of thousands of people. 
These defining moments gave direction to Cuny·s life, lead-
ing him to create his own disaster relief consulting com-
pany, lntertect, which had as a goal to radically reconstruct 
the way disaster relief systems operated throughout the 
world. 
It is from this poi~t on that Cuny became immersed in 
the natural and wartime disasters that plagued the people of 
the Third World, especially the poor. The 1972 earthquake 
in Managua, Nicaragua, lead Cuny 10 devise improved refu-
gee camp designs to save assistance dollars because they 
could prevent secondary problems such as outbreaks of in-
fectious diseases and sanitation breakdowns, as well as 
lessen the feeling of alienation that was a common part of 
traditional camp life. Re found that he could accomplish 
much of this by simply using single-family tents arranged 
in a cross .. axis, with a common area in the center. 
Another devastating earthquake in Central America, the 
Gualcmala earlhquakc of 1976, prompted Cuny to institute 
a plan to teach the indigenous population how to build safer 
structures. These experiences eventually led Cuny to write 
a four-volume Relief Operations Guidebook, which served 
as a manifesto of his new approach to relief and pans of 
which most surely can be found in his two published works, 
Disasters and Developme111 (lntenect Press, 1994) and Fam-
i11e. Co11flict and Respo11se: A Basic Guide (Kumarian Press, 
1999). His approach was not readily accepted by mainstream 
relief groups partly because it advocated a cheaper way of 
providing assistance. The cozy arrangements that many 
USAID workers had when they served overseas were un-
dercut by Cuny's insistence that aid workers live in the field 
so that they could be closer to needs areas. 
As Anderson notes, Cuny moved lntenect away from 
natural disasters 10 coping with disasters that were the re-
sult of war: El Salvador 1984, Sudan 1984, Hom of Africa 
1987, and Sri Lanka 1987. But whatever the focus, Cuny's 
approach was the same. He transcended the traditional re-
lief worker's role of cleaning up the aftermath of a disaster 
to one of limiting the effects of the disaster as well as build-
ing the infrastructure and societal levels that exceeded the 
pre-disaster period. As Anderson observes, this approach 
was indicative of the concept of disaster as opponunity that 
Cuny had adopted early in h.is career as a disaster relief spe-
cia.list. Whether it was a natural disaster or a war-time di-
saster, Cuny advocated sei1.ing the opponunity of disaster 
to construct a better place for people to live. Cuny's insights 
went well beyond improving building practices and dwell-
ings to agrarian reform. This is made clear when Anderson 
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writes the following: "Once the immediate physical crisis 
has been dealt with, Fred argued, reliefagencics should not 
be distributing food or medicines or blankets, but rather using 
their funds 10 buy up land LO redistribute 10 the poor and 
landless. and taking advantage of the economic ruptures 10 
help the previously disenfranchised start small busi nesses." 
Unfonunately, Anderson may be correct when he says that 
"Cuny failed 10 appreciate-or. more likely, had refused 10 
accept-... the profoundly ideological considerations that 
had driven the American government's humanitarian aid 
policy since the beginning of the Cold War ... :· The gov-
ernments of those countries he was working in were Jess 
sympathetic with Cuny's humanitarian mission . The path 
was clear as long as those whom Cuny was serving were on 
the "right" side, but a tilt to the political left created fonni-
dable obstacles, such as the targeting by right-wing death 
squads of some of the Indians that Cuny taught in Guate-
mala. 
Some of Cuny's bigger projects came in the early I 990s 
with the civil unrest in Iraq, Somalia. and Bosnia. Although 
some in official circles thought 1ha1 the demise of the So-
viet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations of Eas1ern Europe 
would lead Lo an era of peace and cooperation. Cuny saw 
the unfolding world 10 be one full of violent possibilities 
involving nationalist and ethnic strife. It would also be a 
world full of opportunities for improvement. but more com-
plicated because disaster response would involve a civil-
ian-military-political alliance for it 10 work in increasingly 
hostile environments. This became evident in Iraq's inva-
sion of Kuwait and the massive refugee problem that was 
created in its aftermath. As Anderson notes. one of Cuny's 
more momentous taSks culminated the 199 1 Operation Pro-
vide Comfort that moved 400,000 refugees 10 a military se-
curity zone. 
This was quickly followed by the 1992 Somalia crisis, 
a depiction of what can go wrong in a famine situation and 
what measures could be used 10 prevent a worsening of the 
situation. Cuny's ability 10 assess the silua1ion and 10 de-
vise means to reduce the loss oflife as well as bolster local 
and national economies is inspiring. In laying out Cuny's 
ideas. Anderson points out 1ha1 Cuny was insistent that f am-
ines are rarely the result of a massive food shonage. but are 
due 10 breakdowns in food distribution, wilh Ll1e devastat-
ing result of increasing the cost of food beyond the means 
of the majority of the people. The typical military response. 
flooding the stricken area, seemed appropriate, but Cuny 
noted lha1 it had serious flaws. The number of airdrops re-
47 
quired 10 serve the needs of those 100 far from urban centers 
was extremely imprecise, unreliable, and expensive. Send-
ing massive amounts of outside food aid 10 fixed feeding 
centers in major towns would not only undermine the local 
markets in those areas. but it would have the devastating 
consequence of taking many farmers away from the fields 
to seek food in urban centers. thereby making ii a food shon-
age more likely in the following year. 
Anderson alludes 10 Cuny's willingness 10 publicly ac-
cept the use of military force on the behalf of those who are 
being victimized. TI1is shows up in Cuny's change ofhean 
in advocating the use of force in Somalia, but only under 
cenain conditions. h is reaffirmed by remarks that Cuny 
made while he was working to install a water purification 
system in Sarajevo. Bosnia, in 1993. Cuny grew critical of 
the UN effort and eventually argued for the withdrawal of 
the UN Protection Force, lifting the arms embargo against 
the Bosnians. and formulating a blueprint of comprehen-
s.i ve air strikes against Serb forces in Bosnia. Like many 
things that Cuny did in the field, this radicalizing of bis view 
of humanitarian assistance led many 10 find Cuny less than 
neutral in his view of warring parties, which in many offi-
cial corners played 10 his disadvantage. Yet Cuny may have 
been right taking sides in lhe face of terrible atrocities. 
A Ii ne journalist. Anderson illustrates his story wilh il-
luminating examples of Cuny's exploits. Al limes, these 
examples become tedious, but neverdull.11 would have been 
interesting had Anderson explained in greater detail Cuny's 
approach to humanitarian relief and its radicalization. De-
spite these shoncomings, I found The Man Who Tried 10 
Save the World entertaining and lively reading.his a splen-
did book. but one that ends on a disturbing note about Cuny 
and those who follow h.is footsteps as humanitarian relief 
workers: "He had become a living example of bis theory of 
converting chaos into opponunity, finding his moment 10 
shine in the massive upheavals that accompanied the end of 
the Cold War. but in the end that chaos had taken his life. 
His death also served as a reminder of a grim new feature of 
modern war. no one is safe." Readers who deal with the 
theory and policy of humanitarian relief should seriously 
consider reading this book 10 instil.I in !hem a sense of real-
ism often absent when they do not come face-to-face with 
the horrors of war. but yet feel the need 10 assist the victims 
1hat are left in its wake. The Man Who Tried 10 Save the 
World could well discourage the would-be relief worker from 
that calling, but it may also add more practitioners 10 the 
ranks of those determined to improve lhe lives of others. 
